Descartes’s Strategy for the Grounding of Physics in the Meditations by Van De Pitte, Frederick P.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Descartes’s Strategy for the Grounding of Physics in the Meditations"
 
Frederick P. Van De Pitte
Laval théologique et philosophique, vol. 53, n° 3, 1997, p. 561-574.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/401113ar
DOI: 10.7202/401113ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 10 février 2017 12:19
Laval Théologique et Philosophique, 53, 3 (octobre 1997) : 561-574 
DESCARTES'S STRATEGY 
FOR THE GROUNDING OF PHYSICS 
IN THE MEDITATIONS 
Frederick P. VAN DE PITTE 
RÉSUMÉ : On accuse souvent Descartes d'être négligent dans les détails d'un exposé, et de man-
quer aussi de précision dans Vaspect formel de son raisonnement. Mais c'est là essentielle-
ment notre problème, bien plutôt que le sien. Il n 'est pas difficile de trouver des exemples de ce 
qu'on pourrait considérer comme des simplifications outrées, qui procèdent en réalité d'un 
excès de subtilité. Ainsi, une intuition qui n'est pas explicitée par Descartes est la reconnais-
sance du soi comme une substance. Or, il se trouve bien d'autres subtilités cartésiennes sem-
blables que nous tentons ici défaire ressortir. 
SUMMARY : Descartes is often accused of being careless in the details of his exposition, and also 
of being less than accurate in his formal reasoning. But this is essentially our problem, rather 
than his. It is not difficult to find examples of what we may see as oversimplification, but which 
is at most excessive subtlety. An insight that is not made explicit, for one, is the recognition of 
the self as a substance. And there are many similar Cartesian subtleties which we try here to 
bring out. 
I t should be readily agreed that what Descartes is doing in the Meditations involves an epistemological problem to which he gives a metaphysical solution. But the 
manner in which he provides this synthesis is both extremely interesting and often 
misunderstood. For example, Descartes is often accused of being careless in the de-
tails of his exposition, and also of being less than accurate in his formal reasoning. 
But this is essentially our problem, rather than his. Certainly part of the problem has 
to do with our lack of experience with meditation in Descartes's sense. The process is 
self-reflexive, profound, and cumulative. A great deal of information is brought to-
gether in order to determine its relevance and ultimate significance for a particular 
concern. But it is not a formal process leading to formal conclusions. Thus Descartes 
does not always make explicit the insights which his reflections make obvious. 
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A second aspect of the problem is that Descartes has very great respect for his 
readers, both with regard to their training and their capacity to follow an argument. 
Therefore, he does not always provide details for them in the way that he would have 
to do for many readers of our era. It is not difficult to find examples of what we may 
see as oversimplification, but which is at most excessive subtlety. An insight that is 
not made explicit is the recognition of the self as a substance. Descartes does point 
out in Meditation II that everything learned about the wax teaches us something 
about the self. Thus the sensory, imaginative and intellectual process by which the 
nature of the wax is revealed is equally effective in disclosing the properties of the 
mind performing these operations. And just as the wax is established to be a sub-
stance which persists through time, losing and acquiring properties, so the mind is 
displayed as an enduring substance as it examines, accumulates data, and draws the 
necessary conclusions. Moreover, the state of awareness itself continuously demon-
strates the existence as well as the nature of this substance. But it is in the Synopsis, 
rather than in Meditation II, that the mind is referred to as a "pure substance." 
Similarly, an example in which Descartes neglects to offer us the formal relations 
which provide the necessary connections in his presentation is to be found in his in-
sistence that imperfection can only be known through perfection. We must recall that 
in scholastic logic, the "E" (or universal negative) proposition completely excludes 
one class of entities from another, e.g., "No reptile is a mammal." The very meaning 
of the proposition requires that both subject and predicate terms be fully distributed : 
each must refer to every member of its referent class. In order to be absolutely certain 
that not a single member of the subject class belongs to the predicate class, each term 
must be fully defined and completely understood. Descartes is simply treating his ob-
servation as an "E" propositions "No Descartes is a perfect entity."1 If he knows that 
he is not perfect (i.e., that he is incomplete, or has unfulfilled potential) then he 
clearly must antecedently know — as an enabling condition — what a perfect entity 
is (or more simply, what "perfection" means). This is a firm logical position, and not 
the mere psychological assertion of which Descartes is sometimes accused. In this 
way, doubt (the most immediate and obvious form of incompleteness), which plays 
such a forceful role in linking the first two Meditations together, is able to bind the 
third in with them to form a necessary progression. This permits the reader to be car-
ried directly into the search for an adequate source of this conception of perfection. 
The fact that we have this conception is as yet a mere fact requiring explanation, and 
the search for its source takes place within, and continues, the investigation of our 
nature as mental entities. 
Two things are at risk here. First of all, because we are seeking the source of a 
concept, we are inclined to look upon the investigation as epistemological in nature. 
It is not. It is the ground or cause of the concept that is sought, and this is a meta-
physical issue. Secondly, the unwary reader may be strongly tempted to ignore the 
details of Descartes's presentation because the ultimate answer seems to be known in 
1. It would perhaps be more technically correct to say that Descartes is recognizing his own case to be an in-
stance of the more general propositions "No incomplete thing is a perfect entity." 
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advance. The very title of Meditation HI ("Of God : that He exists") already suggests 
that we are engaged in proving the existence of God, and thus that Descartes is very 
likely setting up this curious apparatus merely to facilitate that proof. In effect, noth-
ing less than God himself could be the source of such a conception. But it would be a 
mistake to focus immediately on God. At this point we are still caught up in the na-
ture of the human mind and how it is possible for such an entity to grasp perfection at 
all. In order to follow Descartes's presentation successfully, we must recognize that, 
while he follows a metaphysical quest (the ordo essendi), he must proceed according 
to the evidence available to him (the ordo cognoscendi). He must follow efficient 
causality, seeking the grounds in human nature for the effects experienced in reflec-
tion. One might say that Meditation HI should bear the subtitle : "A consideration of 
the implications of our cognitive nature." This is the spirit in which we must ap-
proach the doctrine of "innate ideas." 
The aptness of this seemingly strange terminology is made quite clear by an ex-
ample which Descartes provides.2 We have a natural tendency to believe that we per-
ceive mathematical figures and relations through the senses. But, when pressed, we 
are careful to acknowledge that in fact the objects we observe, or the drawings which 
we consider, are not precisely accurate as examples of geometrical figures. When ex-
amined closely, the angles are not quite right, planes are rough surfaces, and lines are 
irregular and undulating. Therefore, to say that we perceive straight lines, for exam-
ple, or even that we abstract "straight line" from many such perceptions, would be an 
absurdity. It would be very much like saying that we isolate the common element in 
viewing a variety of corkscrews : their straightness. On the contrary, the mind must 
virtually invent, and then impose "straightness" on the lines observed in sense expe-
rience, and thus we are a long way from having even the raw materials for con-
structing a more complex figure, such as a triangle. As Descartes expresses the mat-
ter : 
Therefore, when as a child we first see a triangular figure represented on paper, it is not 
possible for this figure to teach us how a real triangle ought to be conceived as geometri-
cians consider it, for the true triangle is contained in this figure merely as the figure of 
Mercury is contained in an unwrought block of wood.3 
The figure of Mercury is only there if the skill of the artist is brought to bear on 
the wood to make it appear ; and the idea of a triangle is only there if the powers of 
the mind are employed to formulate it. Data which are not inherently significant may 
have significance imposed upon them by an inventive or creative mind. The data 
merely serve as the stimulus, or the occasion, for such activity. Here we have the first 
step in recognizing why ideas cannot simply be reduced to an empirical source of 
data. 
2. Reply to Objections V [Œuvres de Descartes (AT), ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, revised éd., 12 vols., 
Paris, Vrin, 1964-1976 ; AT VII, 181 ; The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (CSM), ed. J.G. Cotting-
ham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch, 3 vols., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985-1991, CSM II, 
262. 
3. Ibid. 
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This much is obviously Descartes's position. But it may not be equally obvious 
that what we see very clearly in the examples which he gives of "the self," "God," 
and mathematical entities, can be understood to apply to all the ideas of sensory ex-
perience, as well. Certainly the example just considered makes it clear that mathe-
matical ideas may be understood to be occasioned by sensory data in the same way 
that other experiential ideas are.4 But just as mathematical ideas must be carefully 
fashioned, so the significance of any sensory experience is properly understood only 
after a similar exhaustive scrutiny and transformation.5 The new idea — now clear 
and distinct, because it is recast into fully understood elements in necessary relations 
— is called innate, not because it is born with the mind in some occult sense, but be-
cause it arises or is born within the mind as a result of the mind's own inherent abili-
ties. The terminology is perfectly sound. 
These are the essential details of Descartes's doctrine of innate ideas. But this is 
to focus on the epistemological process more appropriate to the Regulae. Our concern 
is rather with the powers of the mind which make this process possible. To recognize 
precisely how this doctrine is introduced, we will require more technical details. For 
example, in order to see the full force of innate ideas in the demonstration that God 
exists, we must bring in another important distinction discussed in Meditation III : 
that concerning objective and formal reality.6 Simply stated, "formal reality" is the set 
of properties which constitutes the object itself being considered, as that entity actu-
ally exists.7 "Objective reality," in contrast, is the content of our idea of the object : 
that set of properties and determinations which constitutes the content of the idea so 
that it is the idea of this particular entity. The primary point which Descartes makes 
by means of this distinction is that there cannot be any property in the idea (when it is 
clearly and distinctly conceived) that is not grounded in some actual property of the 
object. This is very much like saying that a photograph, or a mirror image, could not 
contain anything unless it were there to be photographed or reflected. This is an in-
teresting and useful notion, based upon a distinction already available in the scholas-
tic tradition.8 But in using it, Descartes is at the same time setting up a more impor-
tant distinction. 
4. For a discussion of the empirical roots of mathematics, see "The Relation between Mathematics and the 
Doctrine of Eternal Truths in the Development of Descartes's Epistemology," René Descartes's Critical 
Assessments, 4 vols., ed. G.J.D. Moyal, London/New York, Routledge, 1991 ; vol. I, p. 397-412, esp. 
p. 399f. 
5. See "Descartes's Innate Ideas," Kant-Studien, 76 (1985), p. 363-384. 
6. AT VII, 40f. ; CSM II, 28f. Throughout the following discussion it is important to keep in mind that the 
term "reality" is derived from "res" (thing). It therefore refers here to "thingness," essence, or quiddity. 
Confusion will result if it is casually employed (as we currently do) as a synonym for "actuality." Existence 
is not implied by "reality." 
7. Descartes uses the phrase "actual or formal reality" several times. See, e.g., Meditation III (AT VII, 41, 
twice ; CSM II, 28). Note that the phrase would be redundant if "actual" and "real" were synonyms. 
8. This distinction is incorporated into the general discussion of "Realitas" offered by Rudolf GOCLENIUS in 
his Lexicon Philosophicum (Frankfurt, 1613 ; reprint éd., Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1964), p. 990-992. (The 
entry is to be found under "Res," which begins on p. 983). It should be noted, however, that while the ob-
jective-formal distinction was familiar, it was used in a variety of different ways. See Wilhelm RlSSE, Die 
Logik der Neuzeit, 2 vols., Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt : F. Fromman Verlag (Gunther Holzboog), 1964-1970 ; 
Vol. I, Index (e.g., conceptus formalis and conceptus objectivus). 
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In order to appreciate the cleverness of what Descartes is attempting to achieve 
here, it is important to recall the Aristotelian-scholastic doctrine of form. For Des-
cartes (and for his contemporaries), the term "idea" still carried its original Greek 
significance : i.e., it still meant "form."9 And, of course, scholastic epistemology was 
strongly committed to the doctrine of form as the basis for knowledge. While differ-
ent theories had emerged (especially during the 16th century) concerning how the 
form in the object — the "substantial" form — was communicated to the mind, there 
was a general acceptance of the position that knowledge is possible only because the 
form in the object and the form in the mind are the same form. Because the substan-
tial form was understood to determine the kind of entity the object is in its actual ex-
istence, the presence of the same form in the mind would guarantee genuine knowl-
edge of the object. Thus the form played an essential dual role : metaphysically it 
determined the object as existing ; epistemologically it was grasped by the mind as 
the intelligible aspect of the object. In effect, Descartes rejected the metaphysical as-
pect of this doctrine,10 while retaining the epistemological role of form as idea or 
concept. 
His use of the objective-formal distinction is therefore designed to provide a fa-
miliar basis for the acceptance of his epistemology as legitimate, even though it in-
volved an important revision of the scholastic position. The precise nature of his revi-
sion can perhaps most accurately be displayed by placing this discussion in the 
context of the notorious scholastic dictum : "Nothing is in the intellect which was not 
previously in the senses."11 It is generally understood that Descartes rejected this po-
sition as part of his repudiation of traditional epistemology.12 It is extremely interest-
ing, therefore, to recognize that the argument in Meditation m is carefully calculated 
to provide a justification or foundation for this principle, but only after it has been 
clarified and restricted to its proper application. It would be quite easy to overlook 
what Descartes is doing, because it seems clear that the objective-formal distinction 
is essentially epistemological in nature. In fact, however, it serves a dual role in his 
argument, and its second function is to introduce the metaphysical distinction : matter 
and form. These two sets of distinctions are used by him in unison to provide the jus-
tification for his new epistemology, and thus to lay the foundations for his new 
physics. 
9. See GOCLENIUS, Lexicon Philosophicum, p. 208. The entry reads in part : "Generatim idea est forma seu 
exemplar rei [...]. Speciatim, seu peculiariter est forma, seu ratio rei, in mente divina, aeterna & imutabi-
lis, quam intuens simile quid efficit." We cannot ignore Descartes's technical use of the term "idea" once 
we realize that it does not occur in the body of the Meditations until Meditation III. 
10. See, e.g., Letter to De Launay, 22 July 1641 (AT III, 420 ; CSM III, 188). 
11. "Nihil est in intellects quod non priusfuerit in sensu." This principle is attributed to Aristotle, but there is 
no evidence that he did in fact advocate it. The first actual occurrence may have been in the work of Tho-
mas Aquinas. For a discussion of the point (and later developments) see Werner Schussler, "Nisi ipse in-
tellects. Zu einem angeblichen Philosophoumenon Leibnizens," Archiv fiir Begriffsgeschichte, XXXIV 
(1991), p. 314-325. 
12. This misunderstanding began with Gassendi in his Fifth Set of Objections (AT VII, 267 ; CSM II, 186), and 
continues to the present. See Cottingham's note to Gassendi's text (CSM II, 186, n. 3). 
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What we are explicitly offered in the objective-formal distinction is a tool by 
which the content of a given idea can be evaluated with respect to its source.13 As we 
have seen, it is pointed out that the content of an idea must be grounded in some-
thing, and this something is present to the mind by representation.14 Whatever is 
contained in the idea objectively is said to be contained in its ground formally (or 
actually). The effect of this analysis, therefore, is to distinguish between the content 
of the idea (its matter), and its form (i.e., its formal reality). Thus we gradually be-
come aware that the purpose for employing this distinction is not (as it might seem) 
merely to emphasize the identity of content in idea and object, i.e., to stress the va-
lidity of the idea of representation. Rather, and more importantly, it is to provide a 
basis which requires that we seek out separately the ground or cause of each compo-
nent. While it has epistemological implications, the point is essentially metaphysical. 
But the manner in which this metaphysical distinction is raised and employed is 
rather subtle, and the necessary elements are introduced so casually, that the reader 
who is less familiar with the scholastic tradition may fail to note the significance of 
the steps involved.15 
Once we realize how important it is for Descartes's project, it will not be sur-
prising that this brief discussion is very carefully worded, and very subtly structured. 
The phrasing employed here indicates that he has finally isolated the essential crite-
rion permitting a demonstration that some of the things of which he has ideas within 
him actually exist outside him. He begins by pointing out that these ideas can be 
evaluated from different perspectives. On the one hand they may be considered sim-
ply as modes of thought, and in this respect there is "no inequality" among them, 
since they all seem to proceed from the mind in the same manner.16 On the other 
hand, they can be considered as representing different entities, and in this sense they 
are quite diverse. This latter aspect immediately becomes the focus of the discussion, 
providing the basis for investigating the objective reality of each idea, and the source 
or cause from which this reality might be derived. Because this is a very interesting 
point in itself, the tangential issue raised by Descartes goes almost unnoticed as he 
proceeds : 
For even though this cause transfers none of its actual or formal reality into my idea, it is 
not therefore to be supposed that it must be less real, but [rather] the nature of the idea it-
self is such that of itself it requires no other formal reality than that which is bonrowed 
from my thought, of which it is a mode.17 
13. The discussion begins at AT VII, 40 ; CSM II, 27. 
14. It must be understood that to represent does not simply mean to signify. It may also explicitly mean "to 
make the thing present." See GOCLENIUS, Lexicon, p. 981. 
15. This important passage involves three paragraphs (AT VII, 40-42 ; CSM II, 27-29). 
16. What this comment should suggest to us is that indeed all ideas as acts of the mind are of the same essential 
nature. While Descartes is concerned with the idea of God in these pages, the results of his discussion will 
be applicable to ideas in general. 
17. AT VII, 41 ; CSM II, 27. A thoughtful reading of this passage will confirm that its significance requires not 
the usual translation ("that it [the cause] must be less real [...]"), but rather : "that it [the idea] must be less 
real [...]." This error stems from the original French translation, and is important because it obscures the 
precise point at which Descartes rejects substantial forms in their epistemological role, and asserts that the 
mind is competent to produce its own ideas or forms. 
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Both aspects of this statement are essential for Descartes's argument, and their 
combined force must be recognized. The external object is a genuine cause of the 
idea, but not of its formal reality. This formal reality flows from the mind alone. The 
passage can thus go on to conclude that it is only the objective reality of the idea 
which is derived from the actually existing object. 
Even when it is explicitly pointed out, the introduction of the matter/form dis-
tinction is not obvious here ; once again Descartes was perhaps overly subtle. None-
theless, the desired effect is achieved. Two clear statements emphasize the distinction 
between the matter, or content of the idea, and the form or actual reality of the idea as 
a mode of thought. The matter is said to be entirely dependent on the objects nor-
mally some entity perceived through the senses (in this context, explicitly a stone or 
heat). But the form is said to be entirely independent of the object, and grounded in 
the mind alone. The result of introducing this distinction, therefore, is that Descartes 
is able to support fully the scholastic dictum ("nothing is in the intellect [...]") with 
respect to the content of our ideas, while at the same time he reserves the form of our 
thought (i.e., the idea in its formal reality) to the mind itself.18 In effect, this elimi-
nates the traditional role of substantial forms in epistemology, without severing the 
mind from its traditional dependence upon the senses for data. Descartes is simply as-
serting that if the senses provide the basic information, the mind is capable of for-
mulating its own form or idea, as a mode of thought about the data presented.19 
We have already seen how this conception of innate ideas is to be understood : 
The idea of the self gradually developed in Meditation II, or the powers of the self 
indefinitely extended to provide the idea of God in Meditation HL As mentioned ear-
lier, the details of this process are not clearly presented here because Descartes's spe-
cific concern is metaphysical. Thus, as his presentation continues, the groundwork is 
laid for a recognition of the capacities of the mind in virtue of which this process is 
possible. Once again, Descartes proceeds by means of a familiar scholastic distinc-
tion : formal vs. eminent causality. The first use of these concepts occurs with refer-
ence to the examples mentioned above : Descartes mentions the production of a 
stone, or the introduction of heat into a subject not previously warm.20 The transfer of 
heat provides a convincing physical example to support the assertion that a cause 
must antecedently have (formally) that which it passes on to its effect. But the stone 
is said to begin now to exist, after not previously existing, and thus the example is 
18. It should not be difficult to recognize that Descartes's assertion (that the objective reality of each idea must 
be grounded in some actual entity) means precisely that our sensory awareness of the stone, or of heat, is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of our thought of such an object. By extension, this would be true 
for all our empirical ideas taken together. But this would provide only (or, indeed, less than) Hume's bun-
dle of discrete impressions. The important elements for knowledge are order and intelligibility on the one 
hand, and necessity on the other. These structural components are contributed by the mind alone (as the 
form of each thought). More on this below. 
19. The form worked out by the mind would thus reflect the essential nature of the object perceived without the 
transfer of any "intelligible species" or substantial form from the object into the mind. Perception could be 
explained mechanically ; significance could be worked out reflectively ; no occult entities or operations 
would be required. 
20. AT VII, 41 ;CSMII, 28. 
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one of creative causality from God, which is clearly eminent.21 God does not create 
physical objects as a result of physical powers which he possesses, but rather in vir-
tue of much greater powers of a higher order. Once again, therefore, Descartes has 
introduced in a rather casual way terminology familiar to his scholastic readers. But 
in this case, as well, there is a gradual shift in the employment of terms which carries 
the reader into unexpected territory. 
The next time these terms are brought into use, it is to deny that his mind could 
be the exclusive cause of any idea if its objective reality were so great that it could 
not be found either formally or eminently in himself.22 Then they are employed to 
point out that, while the physical properties of which the ideas of corporeal things are 
made up could not be contained in him formally, they could be contained in him 
eminently.23 The point is that, since he has recognized that he is a mental substance, 
and that he shares certain attributes with these things that he takes to be physical sub-
stances (such as duration and number), if he were to consider their properties merely 
in principle as "modes of a substance," then in this sense (as a substance having 
modes) he would seem to be able to contain them eminently. The point asserted, 
therefore, is that the mind might be able to recast data, or information, if it were to 
employ its reflective capacity to transfer the basic principles and structure from one 
concept to another. If the point is not sufficiently clear in Meditation III, then it can 
surely not be missed when we shift our attention to the Replies to Objections 7.24 
There Descartes offers the well-known example of an individual who has the idea of 
a machine which is extremely intricate in nature. He recognizes that there could be 
various causes for the intricacy present in the idea. It could be that the individual had 
actually encountered such a machine, and that therefore the idea simply resembled 
the original : an example of formal causality. Or the individual might have an exten-
sive knowledge of mechanics, or a high degree of intelligence, which would enable 
him to invent the idea without such previous experience. This would be eminent cau-
sality. Then he concludes : "But notice that all the intricacy which is to be found 
merely objectively in the idea must necessarily be found, either formally or emi-
nently, in its cause, whatever that turns out to be."25 This final phrase is significant 
because the combination of scholastic distinctions employed by Descartes is calcu-
lated to permit him to conclude that, while the perfections of God are clearly not in 
21. The example is especially appropriate because the term "eminent" was used to mean "beyond all measure, 
beyond all degree," and it was thus asserted primarily of God. See GOCLENIUS, Lexicon, p. 146. 
22. AT VII, 42 ; CSM II, 29. 
23. Ibid., p. 45 ; p. 31. They could not be contained in him formally, since (thus far) he understands himself to 
be only a mental substance having no physical properties. 
24. AT VII, 103; CSM II, 76. 
25. AT VII, 103 ; CSM II, 76. This example occurs in other contexts as well, e.g., in the Synopsis (AT VII, 14 ; 
CSM II, 10-11) ; Principles, I, 17 (AT VIII, A, 11 ; CSM I, 198). This example helps us to recogni2,e that 
Descartes's reference to eminent causality is not intended to apply exclusively to God as earlier commen-
tators seem to have believed. While God is, of course, the ultimate eminent cause, intricate machines (and 
their ideas) are clearly a product of the human mind. Thus the issue of eminent causality is raised precisely 
for the purpose of discussing innate ideas as a reflective rational process of the human mind (as contrasted 
with a mere imaginative fabrication). 
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him formally — as ground of the objective reality of this idea — they are nonetheless 
contained in him eminently, in virtue of his reflective power of thought.26 
Returning to Meditation III itself, it must be noted that this is one of the most re-
markable examples of subtlety in the works of Descartes. Because the discussion has 
been placed within the framework provided by "the idea of God," it is possible for 
the reader to entirely miss the implications of what has been asserted. Added to the 
earlier position that the formal reality of ideas (as modes of thought) requires no other 
source than the mind itself, we are now informed that the content of ideas (their ob-
jective reality) can also be provided by the mind, through the exercise of its reflective 
and interpretive powers as an eminent cause.27 Only the idea of God requires further 
discussion, as Descartes immediately points out in the following paragraph. Ulti-
mately, as we have seen, Descartes finds that the mind can formulate even the idea of 
God, although he recognizes that the properties which come together in this idea do 
not seem to be able to come from himself alone. The mind is able to touch upon what 
it is unable fully to encompass.28 
Before Descartes goes on to complete his consideration of the idea of God, how-
ever, he has already recognized explicitly that all of our normal ideas of experience 
and reflection can be formulated by the mind. This is the point that must be empha-
sized. Certainly this assertion may be overlooked because of the rather casual manner 
in which it is presented. And it should be pointed out as well that if this extended 
passage is read as a deductive argument aimed exclusively at revealing the source of 
the idea of God, then the assertion might readily be seen as merely a residual obser-
vation. In such a context only the idea of God would be at issue. But Descartes is 
meditating, rather than laying out a formal proof, and thus he is justified in claiming 
the full significance of each revelation which emerges throughout the process. More 
importantly, this is the level of awareness and the degree of acuity which he feels en-
titled to expect in his readers. 
26. Paul Mesnard recognized long ago the role of eminent causality in forming the ideas of physical entities. 
See "Les preuves cartésiennes de l'existence de Dieu dans les Méditations métaphysiques," Cartesio, nel 
terzo centenario nel "Discorso del metodo" (Milano, 1937), p. 603. But he was unable to see how this 
power is employed in forming the idea of God. 
27. This does not mean that sensory data — the basis for all mental operations — can be set aside. It simply 
confirms that such data provide merely the occasional cause for the mind's interpretive process. 
28. Jean-Marie Beyssade has written very insightfully about what he calls Descartes's "construction" of the 
idea of God, or — referring to Willis Doney's terminology — the eliciting or making explicit of the idea. 
(See "The Idea of God and the Proofs of His Existence," The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. J. 
Cottingham, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 178 and 180). He recognizes clearly that the 
innate idea is simply the power or faculty for producing the idea (182). Beyssade is inaccurate — at least in 
phrasing — when he suggests that the idea attained is clear and distinct, but not complete. (As pointed out 
above, no idea can be clear and distinct unless it is complete). But he understands that the idea is not ex-
haustive. This presented no problems for Descartes's readers who were comfortable with the traditional 
view of God as Being itself, or pure act. Since in this Being all potency is actualized, God is simply that 
entity in which there is no unfulfilled potential. This is the governing schema, or as Beyssade calls it, the 
"filter principle" which permits completeness without a stipulation of the infinite array of detail implied. 
What is most excellent in Beyssade's presentation, however, is his recognition of the complementary roles 
of deduction in its ordinary sense and induction (or "lateral thinking," 188-190 and 195) in forming the 
idea of God. But it may still be helpful to point out that both of these processes are encompassed within 
meditation. 
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We are expected, therefore, to recognize the implications of his subtle sugges-
tions. The simple reference to a generalized conception of substance and its modes, 
and thus to the underlying principles and structure apparent through the reflective 
analysis of data present to self-awareness, is to be understood as offering an example 
similar in character to the extraordinary invention of a wonderfully intricate machine. 
Obviously, then, Descartes's almost casual comment is intended to arouse in the 
reader an awareness of the act of creative genius required in the seemingly simple 
interpretation of the content of consciousness. While human nature is incapable of 
giving actual existence to entities in the way that God has, it is nonetheless capable of 
"creative" acts of discovery and invention, based on an understanding of the basic 
principles and structures of entities as these are revealed through experience and re-
flection. Eminent causality, therefore, is unveiled by Descartes as the ground or ex-
planatory principle underlying our capacity to transcend the limits of our passive 
powers of perception, and to formulate ideas on the basis of what thought in some 
way places within our grasp.29 This is the final thrust of Descartes's presentation in 
the closing paragraphs of Meditation III.30 
The conclusions which Descartes draws at this point include the fact that he ex-
ists as a mental substance ; that he has within him the power to formulate the idea of 
a most perfect being — i.e., God ; and that these two premises provide a very certain 
demonstration that God exists.31 But he goes on to explain more clearly how this is 
so. He does this by considering one further issue : the precise manner in which this 
idea was received from God.32 The idea provides none of the normal indications of an 
experiential origin ; nor has it been arbitrarily fabricated by him, since it is not within 
his power to change the idea in any way. It is for these reasons, then, that he con-
cludes, as mentioned above : "The only remaining alternative is that it is innate in 
me, in the same manner as the idea of myself is innate in me" (ibid.). And, finally, he 
tells us precisely how this designation is to be understood. 
Descartes calls this idea the mark (nota) placed in him by God in the act of cre-
ating him — as though it were an artist's identifying signature or symbol. Yet he is 
immediately careful to insist that this mark must not be thought of as distinguishable 
from the work itself. Rather, the creature itself, with its powers and potential, must be 
seen as the image and likeness of God. In turning his thoughts inward, therefore, he 
recognizes both himself as an intellectual entity having limited powers (but with in-
definitely extended aspirations), and also (simultaneously) God as the infinite creator 
and providential sustainer of this self. For in the idea of God are all those perfections 
which extend beyond Descartes's powers, and which therefore he cannot compre-
29. Thus while the idea of God seemed at first to be a quite extraordinary conception, in fact all ideas should 
be understood to be equally remarkable. They are all equal as acts of the mind, and each transcends any 
mere set of data which might serve as its occasion. 
30. See Reply to Objections II (AT VII, 133 ; CSM II, 96) where both of these points are forcefully made. It is 
the power to formulate this idea which demonstrates the existence of God. 
31. It would be incorrect, therefore, to read Descartes as asserting that we are unable to formulate such an idea, 
and that consequently God must provide it directly. 
32. AT VII, 51 ; CSM II, 35. 
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hend actually (contain formally), but which he can "in some way reach through 
thought"33 (contain eminently). Reflective self-awareness thus plays a very interest-
ing role in this presentation. It is not only the means by which the process proceeds ; 
it is also the source of the data with which the discussion is dealing, i.e., through its 
own reflection the transcendent character of human nature in its mental aspect is dis-
played. Once again, therefore, we are reminded of the complex nature of meditation. 
By means of it, the revelation and extrapolation of our own powers permits us to rec-
ognize God.34 And more specifically pertinent to the discussion at hand, the rational 
nature which grounds the demonstration of God's existence as its source is the very 
same nature which permits us to recognize the implications of that demonstration, 
and to work out the other "innate" implications of experience.35 Meditation EQ, there-
fore, provides a careful display of how it is possible for us to employ our reflective 
powers to work out the essential significance of the various kinds of awareness which 
we may attain. Although we are not able to create eternal and necessary truths, we 
can at least discover and recognize them, and impose them on the merely particular 
and contingent data observed in nature. In brief, then, innate ideas are grounded in 
innate powers, which are the mark of the maker (or, more simply, which display the 
maker) within us. 
The product of this process is the distinct idea (essence, nature, or form) of each 
entity which can be clearly conceived. Such ideas must be both complete and distinct 
from other conceptions. We must recognize how strictly Descartes understands each 
entity to be composed of a precise set of properties which stand in necessary relations 
to each other — while the whole set as a unit is distinct from other entities.36 The 
point is clearly stated with respect to the nature of God,37 and of course the nature of 
mathematical entities.38 What this means, in effect, is that each entity, clearly and 
distinctly conceived, will comprise a necessary whole : an integrated unit composed 
of properties in necessary relations which together form a necessary configuration. 
An entity is not clearly and distinctly conceived until this criterion is met ; and the 
idea does not provide us with an eternal and immutable nature or form until it meets 
this criterion.39 Because Descartes accepts the material world to be a single physical 
substance (indefinitely extended and indefinitely divisible), it should be apparent that 
in order to elaborate a doctrine of natural science (a physics) it would be necessary to 
establish principles both for discriminating, and then for relating, physical entities. 
Distinctness would play an essential role in this process. 
33."[...] Omnes Mas perfectiones, quas ego non comprehendere, sed quocunque modo attingere cogitatione 
possum [...]" (AT VII, 52 ; CSM II, 35). 
34. Reply to Objections III (AT VII, 188 ; CSM II, 132). 
35. "Experience" is the appropriate term here, because it reminds us that reflection as well as sensory informa-
tion is included by Descartes within its definition. See Regulae, XII (AT X, 422 ; CSM I, 46). 
36. The relation between distinctness and completeness is explicitly emphasized in his discussion of mind and 
body, See, e.g., Reply to Objections I (AT VII, 120-121 ; CSM II, 86). It should be noted that this insight is 
closely related to the logical point mentioned in note 7, above. 
37. Reply to Objections I (AT VII, 119 ; CSM II, 85). 
38. E.g., the immutable nature of the triangle in Meditation V (AT VII, 64 ; CSM, II, 44-45). 
39. Again, the definition provided by GOCLENIUS (note 9, above) is important to recall. 
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There are two points that must still be made. The first is to reverse our perspec-
tive, and to recall that the "mark of the maker" which we find within us is the insight 
which provides the whole thrust of Descartes's presentation. It must therefore be a 
profound and very forceful insight. This is a kind of analogy by which the gradual 
revelation of the powers inherent in human nature displays simultaneously the nature 
of God.40 The reflective powers of the intellect illustrate an indefinite potential which 
suggests the infinite ; and the power to discover and impose intelligibility on what we 
can only perceive as inert physical data suggests the creative power of God. Yet it is 
precisely our finitude and our ultimate impotence which most clearly reveal God. 
Although we have incredible powers, we are nonetheless finite and have limited po-
tential ; and this recognition, through stark contrast, reveals the infinite power and 
majesty of God as our creator and sustainer. In effect, we have not properly grasped 
our own nature until we have recognized the divine aspect within us which points be-
yond us. Thus, what we have called an analogy is clearly flawed in an essential sense. 
While we are created in the image and likeness of God, we are precisely not God, and 
we know him by negation. 
Nonetheless, it is eminent causality which we share with God as our most re-
markable characteristic, and it is by means of this trait that Descartes accounts for our 
innate ideas. Thus innate ideas are revealed as the sole effect which we are able to in-
vestigate through efficient causality, and which demonstrates the necessary existence 
of God. It is not the having of such ideas, but the forming of them that is essential for 
this purpose. But once this power is established, it accounts a fortiori for all lesser 
ideas, i.e., all of them which can be brought to clarity and distinctness. In this sense 
the idea of God might be seen as a sort of Trojan Horse in Meditation III — with one 
serious reservation. There is nothing hidden in Descartes's presentation. It is we who 
have hidden (through neglect) his conception of innate ideas and its implications. 
The second point that must be made in closing involves the sense in which 
Meditation III provides the foundations of physics. Of course, in the strict sense it 
does not. Only Meditation IV gives us the truth of clear and distinct ideas. Only 
Meditations V and VI link these ideas by necessity to the external world and establish 
thereby the existence of our bodies.41 But it is Meditation III which gives us a direct 
and lucid account (i.e., a non-occult account) of clear and distinct ideas — and this is 
the essential condition for scientia. It permits Descartes to clear away earlier episte-
mological models with a casual remark. This process of reflection and concept for-
40. It is extremely important to recognize that it is not Descartes's existence, as such, which he employs to 
demonstrate the existence of God. That would be simply the repetition of a very old story. Rather, it is the 
existence of a very remarkable nature revealed in reflective self-awareness which requires God. This is 
why Descartes is so firmly committed to the doctrine of eternal truths (essences, natures, or forms). It is es-
sential that God be acknowledged as the source of each nature as well as its existence. Thus the "mark of 
the maker" and its implications constitute the essential element in the Cartesian doctrine of analogy sought 
by Jean-Luc MARION, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, Paris, 1981. More must be said on this topic. 
41. Briefly, in Meditation V mathematical entities and relations are found to be necessary and immutable. But 
without extended physical substance these modes of extension cannot either be or even be conceived. See 
"The Relation between Mathematics and the Doctrine of Eternal Truths...," (note 4, above), p. 406-407. 
Again, the mind is dependent upon the body for its basic information. Nonetheless, however, no ideas of 
these entities are revealed by the senses. 
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mation is so natural to the mind that it seems to be merely remembering what was 
previously known (Plato's "Recollection"), or noticing what was within him already 
(innate ideas in the occult sense : Melanchthon and others). We must however realize 
that this is not his acceptance, but rather his obviation of such theories. They are no 
longer required, and thus not tenable. A modern theory of concept formation is the 
first step toward a sound physics. 
Surely, however, the point that was emphasized above, that clearly grasped con-
cepts must provide the basis for distinguishing among kinds of entities, is the next 
step required. In Meditation VI we are provided the final stage of our metaphysical 
grasp of reality. We find that it is no longer necessary to be fearful of falsehood in 
sensory perception, as long as we are careful to interpret properly the significance of 
perceptions. In short, we have learned to recognize the criteria by means of which 
alone accurate judgments can be made. Essentially this requires the distinct grasp of 
mental reality, of physical reality, and of the relation between them in the human be-
ing. These criteria were both justified and illustrated in Meditation in. The primary 
basis for distinguishing the physical and the mental occurs not merely in Medita-
tion II, but more systematically in Meditation HI with the rejection of substantial 
forms in all merely physical entities. Their concepts contain only physical properties, 
with no admixture of occult elements. Thus it is inappropriate to blur the distinction 
between mind and matter. The clear illustration of this criterion in application is the 
concept of the idea itself. Earlier in Descartes's work there had been some ambiguity 
concerning his use of terms such as "figure," "species," and " idea."42 But now the 
term "idea" is entirely reserved for the purely intelligible correlate of any figure or 
species which might be imprinted on the brain. The senses and imagination are linked 
to, and dependent upon the body ; but the clear and distinct idea belongs to the intel-
lect alone. These very clear criteria for judgment force us to recognize in Meditation 
VI that it is only in this final stage of the Meditations that we can properly understand 
how clarity and especially distinctness {i.e., distinctness from) are to be understood 
and applied — and how they guarantee the validity of sensory experience. Medita-
tion III plays a major role in establishing these criteria. 
Finally, the guarantee which is normally discussed in this context is the guarantee 
provided by a veracious God. It would be inappropriate to neglect Descartes's em-
ployment of this ultimate metaphysical safeguard. But it would be equally wrong, 
and it would make a mockery of Descartes's project in the Meditations, to suggest 
that God is his only guarantee. Unless Descartes had already provided a transparently 
sound epistemological theory, complemented by a metaphysical assurance that our 
purely human powers were capable of fulfilling its conditions, it would be at least ir-
reverent and perhaps more properly blasphemous to maintain that God must guaran-
tee our petty efforts. Descartes assures himself that he is innocent of such impropriety 
by accepting nothing less than necessary truth as his immanent criterion for truth. He 
is then justified in appealing to a transcendent guarantor. Both of these bases for sci-
42. See the recent work of Jean-Luc MARION on this topic : Questions cartésiennes : Méthode et métaphysique, 
Paris, 1991, p. 75f. An English version appears in the Cambridge Companion to Descartes (note 28, above) 
as "Cartesian metaphysics and the role of the simple natures," p. 115ff. 
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entific certainty are dependent upon the strategy employed by Descartes in Medita-
tion III. 
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